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In this paper I examine the connection which Aristotle establishes between pleasure and 
activity, and more precisely, between pleasure and self-perception. I defend that when Aristotle 
links pleasure with activity he is referring to the conscious activities of the soul: seeing, 
knowing, feeling good, etc. Pleasure occurs in our consciousness of perfection because we 
experience pleasure when we feel that our nature develops in the right way. Pleasure is not 
something extra to the activity, but a self-perception of the good development of conscious 
activity, and this way of understanding pleasure helps to solve some questions raised of 
interpretation by J. O. Urmson and D. Frede. 
 
 
 
Aristotle links pleasure with activity in his treatment of pleasure in books VII and 
X of the Nicomachean Ethics. Scholars have usually discussed whether pleasure is 
something that accompanies activity or something peculiar to the activity itself1. As 
Owen points out, in the seventh book Aristotle identifies pleasure with the pleasurable 
activities, while in the tenth book treats pleasure as something that accompanies them2. 
                                                 
1 The main problem is that pleasure seems to be part of the activity, something necessary for the 
subjective perfection, but at the same time is like a result or effect of the activity. «Gewiss kann 
man nun als ein Hinzukommen bezeichnen (ἐπιγινόμενον τέλος). Aber es erscheint notwendig, 
darauf aufmerksam zu machen, dass Aristoteles nicht sagt: die Lust ist ein προσγενόμενον (so 
wie Platon sich immer ausdrückt: etwas ist dann schön, wenn die Idee des Schönen 
προσγίγνεται) oder sie ist ein προστιθέμενον. Davon würde gelten, was 1172 b 23-32 gesagt ist. 
Nein, die Lust wird nicht addiert zur ἐνέργεια. Das Verhältnis von Lust zu ἐνέργεια ist so eng, 
dass man sogar zweifeln kann ob sie nicht identisch sind (1175 b 33). Der Vorgang ist 
komplizierter, innerlicher». Dirlmeier, Franz, Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik (Akademie 
Verlag 1999), p. 582. 
2 Cfr. Owen, G. E. L. “Aristotelian Pleasures”, Logic, Science and Dialectic, G. E. L. Owen and 
M. Nussbaum (eds.), (Cornell University Press 1986), p. 336. 
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What it seems interesting is the sense in which Aristotle talks about activity in the tenth 
book of the Nicomachean Ethics. In this paper I will try to show that when it is said that 
pleasure accompanies activity, he is referring in an implicit way to conscious acts, such 
as feeling, seeing, touching, feeling, thinking or knowing, and that pleasure is a self-
perception of the good development of conscious activity. For this task, I will try to 
establish a connection between the treatment of pleasure of the tenth book and his 
philosophy of life and soul, especially of the De Anima. Finally, I will try to solve some 
questions of interpretation raised by J. O. Urmson and D. Frede. 
 
– I – 
 
The relation between pleasure and self-perception is not explicit in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and it needs some explanation. There are two main uses of the 
word «pleasure» in ordinary language. «Pleasure» can refer to the pleasurable activity, 
as when someone says that «playing football is a pleasure», or it can refer to the 
pleasure which occurs when that activity is done with perfection, as when someone says 
that «playing football brings me pleasure». The first use doesn’t make a distinction 
between the pleasurable activity and the pleasure it brings. In the seventh book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle seems to be treating pleasure in this first sense, 
identifying pleasure with the unimpeded activity of the natural state3. In the tenth book, 
Aristotle asks about the nature of pleasure, and treats it as something that accompanies 
activity: «Pleasure completes the activity (not as the corresponding permanent state 
does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on 
those in the flower of their age»4. There are two different doctrines of pleasure, and it is 
necessary to ask if it is possible to have an accordance between both treatises. In an 
implicit way Aristotle is answering different questions in each treatise: in book VII, 
Aristotle shows the conditions of possibility of pleasure: the requirements which are 
                                                 
3 Cfr. Ethica Nicomachea, 1153 a 13-16.  
4 τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, 
οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. Ethica Nicomachea, 1174 b 32-34. I use Ross’s translation: Ethica 
Nicomachea (Oxford 1915). 
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needed so that an activity is pleasurable. That is, the perfect development of our nature. 
In book X, he is asking about the nature of pleasure, and how can this be related to the 
good life and virtue5. So both doctrines, far from being in disagreement, are compatible, 
and it seems that Aristotle treats pleasure with different points of view6. 
According with what is said in book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, we may 
notice that pleasure only occurs when a natural activity is performed in a perfect way: 
«It is not right to say that pleasure is a perceptible process, but it should rather be called 
activity of the natural state, and instead of ‘perceptible’ ‘unimpeded’»7. Each living 
being has its own natural dispositions, from which spring natural activities. Some of 
these activities are done in order to preserve life (nourishing, reproduction), but others 
have their end in themselves (to perceive, to think, etc.), so they are sought because they 
make life better. This is why Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of pleasure: «By 
things pleasant incidentally I mean those that act as cures (for because as a result people 
are cured, through some action of the part that remains healthy, for this reason the 
process is thought pleasant); by things naturally pleasant I mean those that stimulate the 
action of the healthy nature»8. There is pleasure when the natural faculties develop in 
the right way: because they are being healed or because they perform their activities 
properly. Pleasure only happens when the natural powers of a living being reach their 
perfection, and this is the objective aspect of pleasure: the perfection of natural activity. 
                                                 
5 This is Festugière’s opinion: «Selon (A), le plaisir est donc l’exercise parfait de la vertu. Selon 
(B), il est ce qui parfait cet exercice. La différence est réelle, mais elle implique une précision de 
la doctrine, non pas une contradiction. Dans le premier traité, opposant le plaisir à la γένεσις, 
Aristote, qui n’est pas encore maître absolu de ses concepts, conclut simplement que le plaisir 
est activité. Une réflexion plus pausée lui fait reconnaître que le plaisir n’est pas, au sens propre, 
activité, mais qu’il jaillit de l’activité parfaite come le signe de cette perfection, ainsi que la 
santé parfaite, à la fleur de l’âge, s’épanouit en beauté». Festugière, André-Jean, Aristote. Le 
plaisir. Introduction, traduction et notes (Vrin 1946), p. XXIV. 
6 Cfr. Owen, G. E. L. “Aristotelian Pleasures”, Logic, Science and Dialectic, G. E. L. Owen and 
M. Nussbaum (eds.), (Cornell University Press 1986), p. 335. 
7 οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν 
τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. Ethica Nicomachea, 1153 a 13-16. 
8 λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ 
ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι·φύσει δ’ ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς 
τοιᾶσδε φύσεως. Ethica Nicomachea, 1154 b 17-20. 
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But, on the other hand, there is another condition required in order to feel pleasure: we 
must experience that our natural powers come into perfection, which is to say that some 
kind of consciousness or awareness must be present when the natural activity reaches 
perfection9. Animals differ from plants in that they have sensations and awareness, they 
can feel if their own life and activities are in a good or bad state, and so, their activities 
are accompanied by pleasure and pain: «where there is sensation, there is also pleasure 
and pain, and, where these, necessarily also desire»10. Plants, on the contrary, develop 
their natural capacities without feeling them, and they do not experience pleasure or 
pain11. Thus, here is the subjective aspect of pleasure: the consciousness or awareness 
by which the activity is felt, and it is in this consciousness where pleasure occurs.  
In this sense, there is an interesting text in the IX book of the Nicomachean Ethics 
in which Aristotle links the act of perceiving that we perceive with pleasure: «That 
which is good by nature, we have said, is for the virtuous man good and pleasant in 
itself. Now life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception, in that of 
man by the power of perception or thought; and a power is defined by reference to the 
corresponding activity, which is the essential thing; therefore life seems to be essentially 
the act of perceiving or thinking. And life is among the things that are good and pleasant 
in themselves, since it is determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the good 
[…]. But if life itself is good and pleasant […], and if he who sees perceives that he 
sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case 
of all other activities similarly there is something which perceives that we are active, so 
that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think; and if 
to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence was 
                                                 
9 «Perceptions and thoughts do not give rise to pleasure as sources to some ethereal subject 
languishing behind acts of perception and thought. Rather, perceptions and thoughts are 
pleasures; they are pleasures when our faculties are functioning well and ranging over fine 
objects». Shields, Christopher, “Perfecting Pleasures: The Metaphysics of Pleasure in 
Nicomachean Ethics X”, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. A Critical Guide, J. Miller (ed.) 
(Cambridge University Press 2011), p. 210. 
10 ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία. De 
Anima, 413 b 22-23. I use E. S. Forster’s translation (ed. Ross): De Anima (Oxford 1963). 
11 This is because plants lack a mésotes. Living beings perceive from a medium, or specific term. 
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defined as perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is in itself one of the 
things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is good present 
in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good men, because 
to them existence is good and pleasant (for they are pleased at the consciousness of the 
presence in them of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is 
to his friend also (for his friend is another self): ‒if all this be true, as his own being is 
desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend»12. 
Pleasure has to do with the perception of good existence, with the awareness that 
our vital powers come to fulfilment, and in this sense can Aristotle say that the good 
man is pleased with his own life and existence and, therefore, with the consciousness of 
perfection of his friend. This conception of pleasure shows a link between our 
perception (not only of the world, but primarily of ourselves) and the pleasure or pain 
we experience. So it seems that when Aristotle says that pleasure accompanies activity, 
he is referring to the human (or animal) activity as a whole, with the perception that 
feels the activity reaching its end13. Modern philosophers such as Descartes and Locke 
have understood knowledge as an activity by which the human being gets to know the 
world in an objective way. Reception of objective data has been, since then, the 
                                                 
12 τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ’αὑτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν 
ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ’ αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς 
τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ’αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ’ 
ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως. […] εἰ δ’αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ […], ὁ δ’ ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ 
αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι 
τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε ἂν αἰσθανώμεθ’, ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι 
νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ’ ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), τὸ 
δ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ’ αὑτό (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν 
ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ), αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν 
αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ (συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἥδονται), ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ 
σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν)· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι 
αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. Ethica Nicomachea, 1170 a 15-
1170 b 8. 
13 As Joachim noticed: «Aristotle’s position would seem to carry with it logically that to regard 
activity as complete apart from feeling is an unreal abstraction. All human activity involves 
feeling ‒pleasure or pain‒ and if the feeling of pleasure perfects the activity, will not the 
absence of pleasure diminish the perfection of the activity?». Joachim, Harold H., Aristotle. The 
Nicomachean Ethics (Greenwood Press 1985), pp. 283-4. 
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common treatment of knowledge. The Aristotelian treatment of pleasure gives light to 
understand knowledge and the conscious activity not only from an objective point of 
view, but also from the subjective one. Pleasure and pain accompany each activity when 
they are felt as good or bad. This is clear in the case of sensibility: «To feel pleasure or 
pain is to act with the sensitive mean towards what is good or bad as such»14. The act of 
the sensibility involves the pleasure or pain we experience. But, what does exactly mean 
«to feel pleasure or pain»? It is something so simple as to feel good or bad, in relation 
with something we perceive, think or experience. Once we perceive or think something, 
we have an internal experience in relation with that which is perceived or thought. 
These experiences, which we call pleasure or pain, are also a sensitive evaluation of 
what happens to us. Conscious activities have an objective aspect (what it is seen, what 
we have done, what we get to know, etc.) and a subjective one (how do we feel with 
respect to the objective aspect)15. Aristotle associates perception with some kind of 
awareness, because when a human being feels of thinks, he ‘notices what is going on’16, 
and he feels his own being through pleasure or pain in relation to ‘what is going on’17. 
 
– II – 
 
Having stated that pleasure is related with the self-perception, it seems interesting 
to see the way it must be understood the pleasure-activity (ἡδονή-ἐνέργεια τελεία) 
scheme of the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. In the tenth book Aristotle 
                                                 
14 καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ 
κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. De Anima, 431 a 10-12. 
15 Charles Kahn has tried to show that Aristotle’s concept of sensation implies pleasure and 
pain, some kind of self-consciousness: «Thus, although (and particularly in the De Anima) he 
tends to restrict αἴσθησις to objective perception via the external senses, and avoids using the 
term for ‘subjective’ experience such as pleasure and pain, he everywhere insists upon the close 
and necessary link between αἴσθησις on the one hand, and pleasure, pain and desire on the 
other». Kahn, Charles H., “Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology”, Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie 48 (1966), p. 72. 
16 «The inanimate is unconscious of being affected by alteration, whereas the animate is 
conscious (οὐ λανθάνει) of it». Physics, 245 a 1. 
17 «Where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and, where these, necessarily also 
desire». De Anima, 413 b 22-23. 
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compares pleasure with the act of vision: «Seeing seems to be at any moment complete, 
for it does not lack anything which coming into being later will complete its form; and 
pleasure also seems to be of this nature. For it is a whole, and at no time can one find a 
pleasure whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. For this reason, too, 
it is not a movement»18. Pleasure is something perfect at any time in which it occurs. 
You can feel or not feel pleasure, but what is impossible is to quasi-feel it. This is a 
peculiarity of all conscious acts, and in this way pleasure is related with the ἐνέργεια. 
This needs some explanation. The term ἐνέργεια is used by Aristotle in different 
contexts, with different connotations19. In a general way, ἐνέργεια is characterized as 
opposed to δύναμις (potentiality)20. Ἐνέργεια is everything which has reached its end, 
everything which is perfect. In this sense, a physical movement (κίνησις) is also a 
ἐνέργεια, because it is a process of actualization. Then, it is necessary to distinguish 
between two kinds of ἐνέργεια. On the one hand, there are activities which reach 
perfection only when the activity has ended: for example, the activity of building a 
house. The end of the activity, the house, is achieved only when we have stopped 
building. This kind of activities, which are processes, are called by Aristotle in the 
Metaphysics κινήσεις (that is to say they are a ἐνέργεια ἀτελής). On the other hand, 
there are activities in which their end is in the activity itself: for example seeing. Once I 
see, I have the object seen, and I continue seeing. The act of seeing is complete at any 
time it happens. This kind of activities are simply called by Aristotle ἐνέργειαι. I may 
call them, in order to distinguish them from the κινήσεις, «perfect ἐνέργειαι» (τελείαι). 
This distinction, which is not explicit in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
gives light to understand the nature of pleasure as something which accompanies or 
completes the activities (ἐνέργειαι). However, in the seventh book, it is not so clear that 
                                                 
18 ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ’ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον 
γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιούτῳ δ’ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί, καὶ κατ’ 
οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. 
διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν. Ethica Nicomachea, 1174 a 14-18. 
19 Cfr. Chung Hwang, “Different Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of 
Aristotle”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17 (1956), pp. 56-65. 
20 Cfr. Bonitz, Hermann, Aristotelis Opera (vol. V). Index Aristotelicus (Walter de Gruyter & 
Co. 1961), p. 251. 
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Aristotle could have this distinction in mind: although he denies that pleasure is a 
process (γένεσις), there are no indications to consider that he viewed pleasure as an 
ἐνέργεια of the perfect type (or something related to a perfect ἐνέργεια), because he 
simply identifies pleasure with the unimpeded activity21. 
In the tenth book Aristotle compares pleasure with the act of vision because 
pleasure, as vision, is not a movement (κίνησις), it is a whole, complete in every instant 
in which happens. That is the same as to say that pleasure is a ἐνέργεια of the perfect 
type, although Aristotle does not say it explicitly anywhere. But there are references 
which justify that he viewed pleasure as a perfect ἐνέργεια. In Metaphysics Λ he 
assimilates God’s activity with pleasure: «Its actuality is also pleasure»22, and it is clear 
that God’s activity is the most perfect ἐνέργεια. In the Nicomachean Ethics he mentions 
the activity of pleasure as ἐνεργεῖν, and as opposed to κίνησις: «They do not seem to be 
right even in saying that it is a movement. For speed and slowness are thought to be 
proper to every movement, and if a movement, e.g. that of the heavens, has not speed or 
slowness in itself, it has it in relation to something else; but of pleasure neither of these 
things is true. For while we may become pleased quickly as we may become angry 
quickly, we cannot be pleased quickly, not even in relation to some one else, while we 
can walk, or grow, or the like, quickly. While, then, we can change quickly or slowly 
into a state of pleasure, we cannot quickly exhibit the activity (ἐνέργειν) of pleasure, i.e. 
be pleased»23. 
                                                 
21 «In book VII pleasure is identified with ἐνέργεια only because it is not a γένεσις. No further 
reason is given for identifying the two nor is it explicitly claimed that they are in every way 
identical. One can claim that a horse is an animal while not thereby implying that there is no 
difference between being a horse and being an animal. Such identity claims are ambiguous and 
must be understood from their context. In book VII that context is an argument that pleasure is 
not a becoming or process. Since in Aristotle’s thought the fundamental opposition in speaking 
of activities (in the broad sense of the word) is between γένεσις and ἐνέργεια, in denying that 
pleasure is the former he is naturally led to identify it with the latter. Such an identification, 
however, does not exclude the possibility that upon further examination there may be seen to be 
some kind of distinction between the two». González, Francisco J., “Aristotle on Pleasure and 
Perfection”, Phronesis 36 (1991), p. 147. 
22 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου. Metaphysica, 1072 b 16. 
23 οὐ καλῶς δ’ ἐοίκασι λέγειν οὐδ’ εἶναι κίνησιν. πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ 
βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ’ αὑτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ’ ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον 
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However, there is a problem of difficult solution. Having stated that pleasure 
shares the characteristics of the perfect activity (ἐνέργεια), which is the proper relation 
with it? Is pleasure a ἐνέργεια, or something which is superadded to it? On the one 
hand, Aristotle affirms that pleasure shares the same characteristic with the conscious 
activity: it is perfect at any time. On the other hand, Aristotle nowhere in the tenth book 
says that pleasure is an activity in itself, but something that accompanies them24. The 
problem may be solved if the activity, the ἐνέργεια, is not only considered from an 
objective point of view, but also from the subjective. An activity is not only that which 
is done, but also involves that which is felt while we were doing something. Ἐνεργεια is 
the human action as a whole: the activity, not only from the outside (what is done), but 
also from the inside (how it is felt). The conclusion is that pleasure is a feeling of the 
conscious activity, the feeling of goodness of the ἐνέργεια in which our acts of 
perception, sensation and knowledge consist. That is the same as to say that it is a 
ἐνέργεια which depends on another ἐνέργεια, that of our conscious acts. 
The view that pleasure is a feeling of self-perception in the conscious activities 
(so that always accompanies a ἐνέργεια) does not contradict the fact that pleasure can 
happen in physiological activities (which can be characterized as κινήσεις). It is 
important to notice that those processes, such as eating, drinking, running or having sex, 
are pleasurable because there is some kind of perception in them (and this perception is 
a perfect ἐνέργεια). That is the reason why humans and animals have pleasure in the 
good development of their natural activities while plants not. Plants lack a μεσότης, 
they don’t have a medium from where to perceive. Pleasure happens when a natural 
capacity has reached its end, and that perfection is perceived25. 
                                                                                                                                               
ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἥδεσθαι δ’ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, 
βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ 
βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ’ αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ’ ἥδεσθαι. Ethica Nicomachea, 
1173 a 31-1173 b 4. 
24 See Ricken, Friedo, “Wert und Wesen der Lust”, Aristoteles. Die Nikomachische Ethik, O. 
Höffe (ed.), (Akademie Verlag 1995), p. 221. 
25 That is what Alexander Grant understood: «Aristotle in defining Pleasure as ὁ τελειοῖ τὴν 
ἐνέργειαν, makes it, not «the sense of what promotes life», but rather the sense of life itself; the 
sense of the vividness of the vital powers; the sense that any faculty whatsoever has met its 
10 
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If pleasure is a feeling (ἐνέργεια) of the conscious act (which is a perfect 
ἐνέργεια), there is no problem for the application of the pleasure-activity scheme to the 
«replenishment processes». In these kind of activities there is a remedy of a lack for the 
perfect state of our nature. They can be called κινήσεις because they are physical 
movements which require time to reach perfection. But, on the other hand, these 
processes are pleasurable when they are felt, when we are conscious of them, and that is 
to say, when there is a ἐνεργεῖν of the human soul. 
The metaphysical account of pleasure of the tenth book of the Nicomachean 
Ethics shows that pleasure is something which accompanies the perfect ἐνέργειαι (the 
conscious activities: thinking, knowing, perceiving), making them better from the 
inside. Pleasure is a self-perception or feeling (ἐνέργεια) of the right development of 
conscious living. 
 
– III – 
 
This conception of pleasure as the consciousness of the perfect development of 
one’s own life can be contrasted with Urmson’s and Frede’s interpretation of Aristotle’s 
treatment of pleasure. Urmson thinks that Aristotle understands pleasure in the tenth 
book of the Nicomachean Ethics as perfect activity and that he tries to apply this 
concept to all kinds of pleasure, when there are pleasures which cannot be treated in this 
way. In his opinion, there are two kinds of pleasures: the enjoyment of activities (in 
which the pleasure-activity treatment fits properly), and the pleasant feelings which are 
a product of things we do, but not an enjoyment of the activity itself (and, in this case, 
the pleasure-activity treatment would not be valid). These pleasant feelings would be 
                                                                                                                                               
proper object. This definition then is equally applicable to the highest functions of the mind, as 
well as to the bodily organs. Even in the case of pleasure felt upon the supplying of a want, the 
Aristotelian doctrine with regard to that pleasure was, that it was not identical with the supply, 
but contemporaneous; that it resulted from the play and action of vital powers not in a state of 
depression, while the depressed organs were receiving sustenance. […] Pleasure then, according 
to Aristotle, proceeds rather from within than from without; it is the sense of existence; and it is 
so inseparably connected with the idea of life, that we cannot tell whether life is desired for the 
sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life». Grant, Alexander, The Ethics of Aristotle, 
illustrated with essays and notes (Longmans 1874), vol. I, pp. 248-9. 
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those involved in the intemperate activities, linked with the sense of touch, according 
with a distinction that makes Aristotle in the III book of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
«Temperance and self-indulgence, however, are concerned with the kind of pleasures 
that the other animals share in, which therefore appear slavish and brutish; these are 
touch and taste»26. In this way, Urmson says that «Aristotle fails to make explicitly clear 
to himself the central point; he persuades himself that the intemperate pleasures are to 
be distinguished from the pleasure of looking at pictures because they involve the sense 
of touch and thus fails to see that he has really made a distinction between enjoying 
activities essentially involving use of the senses and doing things which produce a 
pleasant feeling27». And so, Aristotle «makes the uncommon error of assimilating the 
enjoyment of feelings to the enjoyment of activity28». Urmson’s position about the 
Aristotelian doctrine of pleasure emphasizes the differences between pleasures, but it 
fails to see that there is a peculiar ἐνέργειν of the soul involved in the tactile pleasures, 
and that even these «pleasurable sensations» are some kind of ἐνέργεια, the perfect use 
of our senses. That is exactly what C. C. W. Taylor has replied: «While Aristotle 
believes that the intemperate man goes for his intemperate activities for the sake of 
bodily sensations, he does not say or imply that he enjoys only those sensations and not 
the activities themselves. Intemperate pleasures are important examples of a sort of 
enjoyment of activity that is itself constituted in part by the enjoyment of sensations. 
Hence in those cases it is a mistake to infer that someone who enjoys that sort of 
sensation does not enjoy the activities themselves. But that mistake, if committed by 
anyone, has been committed by Urmson, not by Aristotle. Where Aristotle goes wrong 
is in his very queer view of what it is that is enjoyable about «intemperate» activities 
[...]. Specifically, he is wrong to classify all these forms of enjoyment as consisting 
purely in the enjoyment of tactile sensations. But, contra Urmson, he is right to think 
                                                 
26 περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ’ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα 
κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ’ εἰσὶν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις. Ethica 
Nicomachea, 1118 a 23-26. 
27 Urmson, James O., “Aristotle on Pleasure”, Aristotle: a Collection of Critical Essays, J. M. E. 
Moravcsik (ed.) (Macmillan 1968), p. 329. 
28 Urmson, James O., “Aristotle on Pleasure”, p. 331. 
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that the enjoyment of tactile sensations fits happily into his general account of pleasures 
as the enjoyment of activities, under the heading of enjoyment of the exercise of the 
senses»29.  
In this way it is interesting the position of David Bostock, who explains that the 
enjoyment is not the replenishment, but the awareness or perception of this 
replenishment: «The pleasure cannot just be the replenishment, for the replenishment 
takes place in the body, whereas we do not say that it is the body that is pleased (1173b-
9-11). The pleasure, then, does not take place in the body. So where does it take place? 
The obvious answer is ‘in the mind’. And what is it that goes on in the mind when one's 
body is replenished, and one is pleased by this? Evidently, the perception of this 
replenishment. In the standard case, my perceiving faculties will not be at all impaired, 
and I can taste, touch, and feel perfectly well when I am thirsty. So the thought is that 
what I enjoy is not, as we loosely say, the drinking, but rather the taste of the drink, its 
cooling touch in my throat as it goes down, and very possibly the bodily feeling that I 
have, which can only be described as feeling that the drink is doing me good, as my 
thirst disappears. These are perceptions, and perception is certainly something that 
Aristotle counts as an activity, of the kind that can be (or be ‘completed’ by) a pleasure, 
whereas the drinking itself is a process. My suggestion is, then, that in a so-called 
‘pleasure of replenishment’ Aristotle's view is that the pleasure is to be found not in the 
replenishment itself but in the perception of it. It is this perception that is the associated 
activity of an unimpaired part of us»30. In this way, pleasure accompanies a perfect 
activity of perception, which in case of the replenishment processes is a perception or 
awareness of this replenishment, and this activity is perfect because its object, the 
replenishment, is perfect. So the pleasure-activity explanation of pleasure of the tenth 
book fits can be applied also to this kind of pleasurable activities. 
In some way, as a continuation of Urmson’s position, we have the interpretation 
of Aristotle’s doctrine on pleasure made by Dorothea Frede. Frede thinks that there are 
                                                 
29 Taylor, C. C. W., “Urmson on Aristotle on Pleasure”, Pleasure, Mind and Soul, C. C: W. 
Taylor (ed.) (Clarendon Press 2008), p. 119. 
30 Bostock, David, “Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Phronesis 33 (1988), p. 269. 
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two kinds of pleasures: the pleasure which accompanies the perfect activities (such as 
hearing, knowing, seeing, etc.), that Aristotle treats in books VII and X of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and pleasures which appear as an effect of the fulfilment of a 
desire (such as eating, drinking, etc.), which are treated in the Rhetoric as a process of 
restoration to the natural state. For Frede, Aristotle is not aware that this distinction 
exists, even though we find a different treatment in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the 
Rhetoric: «Did he realize that neither «pleasure» nor «pain» constitutes a unitary genus 
and therefore any attempt to give a unified definition of its nature must fail? Aristotle is 
not usually shy to admit a plurality of meanings for key terms. So why did he not come 
up with the solution he resorts to in other connections, namely that ‘pleasure is used in 
many ways’, with his favourite type of pleasure as the ‘focal meaning’ of the other, 
secondary kinds? In the case of pleasure, such a solution would be highly problematic: 
it would presuppose that all pleasures relate to the central type in the way that all 
healthy things depend on health as their focus […]. No such relation seems to exist 
between pleasure as an integral part of a perfect activity and the other kinds that consist 
in the fulfilment of a desire, in the restoration of a mental (or physical) equilibrium, or 
in the sheer ‘feel’ of sensuous pleasures31». 
Although it is true that Aristotle doesn’t have the same concept of pleasure in all 
his writings, the question is whether Aristotle’s treatment of pleasure in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (particularly in the tenth book) is suitable for explaining the 
metaphysical and psychological status of pleasure in all cases and experiences. Aristotle 
links pleasure with the perfect ἐνέργεια, with the activities of knowledge and sensation, 
and, as it has been shown, with some kind of awareness or feeling (that is why animals 
feel pleasure but plants do not). This pleasure-scheme seems to explain also the pleasure 
of restorative activities, because these processes are pleasurable in the way they are felt. 
The pleasures which accompany the satisfaction of a desire are due to the awareness of 
a perfection of the natural state. For example, when someone is thirsty and drinks some 
water, he feels pleasure because there is something which satisfies the faculty of 
                                                 
31 Frede, Dorothea, “Pleasure and Pain in Aristotle’s Ethics”, The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics, R. Kraut (ed.) (Blackwell Publishing 2006), pp. 272-273. 
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perception, and this is felt as pleasurable. Although Aristotle doesn’t use this pleasure-
activity scheme in all his works, it seems to explain all the pleasurable experiences. 
In Frede’s opinion, it would have been better for Aristotle to distinguish between 
‘remedial pleasures’ (that is, pleasures with a lack-replenishment structure, preceded by 
desire) and pleasures which are the result of unimpeded natural activities: “Given that 
he regards the pleasures of the body as the tempters to excess and antidotes to pain, it 
might seem a much better solution to assign to them the status of remedial pleasures as 
he does in he Rethoric and to distinguish them from the pleasures of unimpeded natural 
activities”32. However, this distinction, which could be useful, would involve the 
problem of how to understand the nature of pleasure. It could be said that from an 
objective point of view (from the outside) it is possible to speak of two kinds of 
pleasurable activities: those which are due to restoration to the natural state (there is a 
lack which is fulfilled), and those which are due to the performance of some natural 
disposition (ἑξις). But, in every case, there is a self-perception of perfection in which 
the pleasurable experience consists. 
Some of the problems which Frede points out seem to disappear when it is noticed 
that pleasure accompanies the awareness of perfection of the natural state. Frede, just 
like Urmson, makes a distinction between two kinds of pleasures as if there wouldn’t be 
a metaphysical connection between them. But this connection seems to exist, and is the 
awareness of perfection of our own nature which is present at the time we experience 
pleasure, because pleasure is just a quality of this self-awareness (the perfect ἐνέργεια). 
As Urmson, Frede thinks that eating, drinking and sexual pleasures are sensuous 
feelings, and they cannot be understood as perfect activities33 and that the ἐνέργεια 
explanation of pleasure (what she calls the performative aspect) that Aristotle gives in 
the Nicomachean Ethics is unsatisfactory in the case of some pleasures: «We hear, see, 
touch, or taste many things in the most natural and therefore ‘perfect’ way without 
either pleasure or pain, as the examples of everyday activities of eating and drinking and 
                                                 
32 Frede, Dorothea, “Nicomachean Ethics VII. 11-12: Pleasure”, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics 
Book VII. Symposium Aristotelicum, C. Natali (ed.), (Oxford University Press 2009), p. 201. 
33 Cfr. Frede, Dorothea, “Pleasure and Pain in Aristotle’s Ethics”, p. 265. 
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so on show; they are generally unimpeded, but often neither pleasant nor unpleasant. It 
would be quite a bad ad hoc explanation that neutral sense experiences lack pleasure 
because of some unknown impediment in their performance»34. But why? The ἐνέργεια 
explanation fits properly in the case of these pleasures, because when we touch, see, 
hear, etc., and we do not find pleasure it is because the whole activity, in which the use 
of the senses is involved, is not as perfect as it could be. The ἐνέργεια-ἡδονή view of 
pleasure gives light to see that it is only in the self-awareness of my perfect natural 
activity that I find pleasure. These moments of perfection do not always happen in the 
everyday life, because perfection in the activity requires that the human being as a 
whole, in his soul and in his body, is in his best condition35. If I am going on excursion 
to the mountains and I have a headache, I will not find pleasure in the contemplation of 
the mountain, even if I perceive it properly. There is something that lacks, and the 
activity is not perfect. 
Another problem treated by Frede is that Aristotle limits his pleasure conception 
to the completion of activities, but it seems that there are processes which can be 
enjoyable even when they don’t find their own end, just as I can find pleasure when I 
am listening to a Beethoven’s sonata, although I don’t listen to it until its end. This 
objection can be very easily replied, because when we are enjoying a process which has 
not reached its end, it is because there is a perfect or complete activity in this process. 
For example, when I am listening to the sonata, my conscious activity in the use of the 
senses and the intelligence is reaching perfection in every time the sonata is being 
                                                 
34 Frede, Dorothea, “Pleasure and Pain in Aristotle’s Ethics”, p. 265. 
35 Moreover, some of the examples which Frede brings up as problematic are not so clear as 
they may seem. She says: «Suffering an injury is unnatural, and it constitutes an impediment, 
but it clearly is not an unnatural impeded activity. The same is true of unpleasant tastes, sights, 
and touches. Physically painful experiences clearly are detrimental processes, not impeded or 
unnatural activities». (Frede, Dorothea, “Nicomachean Ethics VII. 11-12: Pleasure”, p. 204). 
But these cases can also be seen as natural impeded activities (or unnatural activities). In the one 
hand, it is natural and good to have a healthy body, and that is a good activity of the organism, 
and when someone is injured, that is an obstacle to the good activity of the organism. On the 
other hand, in the case of an injury the awareness of the perfection of one’s body (which is a 
natural activity) isn’t fulfilled, and one feels pain. In the case of unpleasant tastes, sights or 
touches, they are due to the lack of harmony between the faculty of perception and that which it 
is perceived, so that the natural activity doesn’t develop in the right way. 
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played. We find pleasure while listening to the sonata not because the sonata has 
reached its end, but because our activity in the use of the senses is perfect while the 
sonata is being played. The interpretation of pleasure as the awareness of the perfection 
of the natural activities (nourishing, growing, seeing, hearing, contemplating, etc.) 
avoids some of the limitations that Dorothea Frede points out. 
 
 
Aristotle’s treatment of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics gives light to 
understand the human activity as a whole which imply the use of the senses and reason 
in the several activities we perform. In this way, there is a self-perception of our own 
existence in relation to what we do, see and think, and pleasure is related with the 
awareness of the vital capacities coming into perfection. Every sensation, every act of 
knowledge, is accompanied by pleasure or pain as something intrinsic to them. Pleasure 
is linked to the ἐνέργεια, and the ἐνέργεια seems to be the activities of perception and 
knowledge, that is to say, the conscious activities. It is in the self-perception, proper to 
these activities, that we may feel pleasure or pain, depending on the perfection of what 
is felt. 
 
 
Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri  
Universidad de Navarra 
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